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bound thereby, should accept the definition of the legislature in ascer-
taining or giving effect to intention from the language of the enact-
ment itself.
CRIMINAL LAW
FEDERAL ANTI-RACKETEERING STATUTE-CONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF PROVISION FOR SUIT ONLY AT DIRECTION
OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL
An indictment was found against the defendant, 'based upon the
federal anti-racketeering statute. The defendant challenged both
statute and indictment; the former because it provides that prosecu-
tion under it "shall be commenced only upon the express direction of
the attorney-general of the United States," ' the latter because of its
declaration that "this prosecution has been commenced upon the ex-
press direction of the attorney-general of the United States." The
demurrer was overruled. U, S. v. Bioff et al.2
In challenging the statute itself, defendant relies upon both the
doctrine of procedural due process and that of non-delegability of
legislative power. In adversely disposing of the due process objec-
tion the court reasoned that the attorney-general's power over the suit
is but an adaptation of the prosecuting attorney's historic power,
without leave of court, to arrest prosecution by nolle prose qui.
3 It
might have added that the existence of such accepted power in the
attorney-general in no way resembles those serious interferences with
the conduct of an impartial trial which have been judicially con-
demned in the name of due process.4 The other constitutional con-
tention is more difficult of disposition. If the power of control over
criminal prosecutions under the act involves, not the policy formula-
tion that is the essence of the legislative function but that judgment
as to law enforcement which is intrusted to the executive, the answer
248 Stat. 980, 18 U. S. C. A. Sec. 420 C. (Supp. 1940).
840 F. Supp. 497 (S. D. N. Y. 1941)
a U. S. v. Woody, 2 F. (2d) 262 (D. Mont. 1924).
4 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), mob domination of trial; Brown v. Miss.,
297 U. S. 278 (1935), conviction upon third-degree evidence; see Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U. S. 103 (1935), indicating a similar result in case of conviction on perjured tes-
timony.
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is of course clear.5 But if the power be viewed as legislative, the
defendant's case is stronger. True the proscription against the dele-
gation of legislative power is not absolute; 6 participation in the ex-
ercise of the power can be vested in executive agencies or officers pro-
vided the guiding outline of policy is that of the legislature.7 Nor
need channelizing controls be spelled out in the statute when the lan-
guage employed calls up a vivid background of accepted meaning.8
But here there is a total want of express guides to the exercise of
the attorney-general's power. Yet the answer on the constitutional
issue must be the same, for the absence of tangible control is com-
pensated for by the existence of an historic practice, which estab-
lishes definite guides to action and non-action.
In objecting to the attorney-general's power as a statement of
fact in the indictment, defendant shifted in his attack from constitu-
tional to criminal law. To avoid the general rule that an indict-
ment does not fail by reason of the receipt by the grand jury of in-
admissible evidences defendant attempted to bring the facts under
an exceptional class of cases by arguing that the knowledge that
"Washington wants this indictment," tends to overawe the grand
jury and so is prejudicial. 1" In refusing to extend the rule the court
cited several statutes which give the attorney-general power to appear
in person and to conduct proceedings before a federal grand jury."
This being true, the court held, the mere report to the grand jury of
the attorney-general's direction does not afford ground for objec-
tion.1 2  The responsibility for determining when the criminal ma-
I Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230 (1915); Locke's
Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1873); Cincinnati W. and X. R. R. v. Clinton County Comm'rs., 1
Ohio St. 77 (1852).
' Cousens, The Dclegation of Federal Legislative Power to Executive Officials, (1935)
33 M cIH. L. REv. 512. Whitcside, Delegata Potetas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of
American Constitutional Law, (1929) 14 CoRu. L. Q. 168.
1 Panama Refining Co. et at. v. Ryan et al., 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Butterfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Ill. C. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452 (1910); Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co., 218 U. S. 88 (1910); A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. et al. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495 (1935). The constitutionality of
the statutes in the I. C. C. cases was upheld because there was an historic meaning
of the term "reasonable rates." In the Sclwechter case the court overruled part of the
N. I. R. A. because there was no such background for the term "fair competition."
2 Anderson v. U. S., 273 F. 20 (C. C. A. 8th 1921).
IOU. S. v. Rubin et al., 218 F. 234 (D. Conn. 1914). The indictment was quashed
because of hearsay evidence.
n 5 U. S. C. A. Sec. 310; 15 U. S. C. A. See. 4, 25 and 77T (b).
2 U. S. v. Gramlich et al., 19 F. Supp. 422 (S. D. Ill. 1937). The court held the
indictment would not fail because the quoted language was omitted, since it appeared
affirmatively from the records of the clerk's office that such authority was extended by
the attorney-general before the grand jury investigation was instituted.
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chinery of the government should be put in motion, must be lodged
somewhere. It is an historical fact that the attorney-general has
always had control of public prosecutions in England,13 and in this
country, except where such control has been diminished by statute. 4
C. R. M.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY-DIVORCE
FOR FRAUDULENT CONTRACT.
The parties in the case first became acquainted sometime during
the spring of 1937; the plaintiff, a man, claiming the first meeting
was May 18; the defendant, a woman, claiming it was March 29. A
week after their first meeting they engaged in illicit sexual relations.
Pregnancy resulted, and the defendant later brought a bastardy charge
against the plaintiff. Rather than stand trial on the charge, he mar-
ried her in October. On the following January 4, a child was'born
to the defendant which according to the attending physician had been
conceived approximately March 3'. The plaintiff, believing he was
not the father of the child, sought a divorce on the grounds of
fraudulent contract, a statutory ground in Ohio,' claiming the de-
fendant had fraudulently secured the marriage by declaring him to
be responsible for her pregnancy. The common pleas court found
that the plaintiff was not the father of the child, and granted a
divorce. The defendant appealed. Held: Reversed. When a man,
who has had illicit relations with a woman, marries her, knowing
at the time she is pregnant, he is conclusively presumed to be the
father of the child, and a divorce cannot 'be obtained on the ground
of fraud. Kawecki v. Kawecki, 67 Ohio App. 34, 21 Ohio Op. 76
(Court of Appeals of Lucas County 1941).
In Ohio, every child born during lawful wedlock is presumed
to be legitimate. 2 Before the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's
representation respecting the paternity of the child was fraudulent,
he must overcome this presumption. However, in the principal case
13 HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND p. 37; 3 Excyc. BRIT. 63; 3 BL. COmm. 27.
"
4 Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F. (2d) 676 (App. D. C. 1938).
1 OHIO GEN. CODE, Sec. 11979.
Powell v. State, 84 Ohio St. 165, 95 N. E. 660 (1911).
212
